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ABSTRACT
We report the first active acoustic side-channel attack. Speakers
are used to emit human inaudible acoustic signals and the echo is
recorded via microphones, turning the acoustic system of a smart
phone into a sonar system. The echo signal can be used to profile
user interaction with the device. For example, a victim’s finger
movements can be inferred to steal Android unlock patterns. In our
empirical study, the number of candidate unlock patterns that an
attacker must try to authenticate herself to a Samsung S4 phone
can be reduced by up to 70% using this novel acoustic side-channel.
The attack is entirely unnoticeable to victims. Our approach can
be easily applied to other application scenarios and device types.
Overall, our work highlights a new family of security threats.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Radar and sonar systems use radio and sound waves to track ob-
jects, including humans. In recent years this technology has been
developed extensively to support human computer interactions
by tracking the movement of human bodies, arms, hands or even
fingers [18, 21]. However, existing work has rarely investigated the
security implications of those technologies.
In this paper, we report some alarming security implications
of tracking human movement via sound waves. Specifically, we
present the first active acoustic side-channel attack that can be used
to steal sensitive information such as Android unlock patterns. In
our attack, human inaudible acoustic signals are emitted via speak-
ers and the echo is recorded via microphones, turning the acoustic
system of a smart phone into a sonar system. The echo stream not
only gives us information about a victim’s finger movement but
leaks her secrets too.
CovertBand [19], a recent clever study, examined the security
(more accurately, privacy) implication of tracking human move-
ments with acoustics. However, its security and privacy implication
was largely a single-bit information, e.g. whether someone was
in a room or not, or whether she was moving or standing still.
This creates an effective covert channel leaking people’s privacy
information, but it barely constitutes a side-channel attack.
All known acoustic side-channels attacks, e.g.[1, 4, 20], are pas-
sive, meaning that acoustic signals in the side-channel are generated
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by the victim but are eavesdropped by the attacker. In contrast, our
approach is an active side-channel, meaning that acoustic signals
in the side-channel are induced by the attacker.
In our experiment we use an off-the-shelf Android phone as an
example of a computer system with a high quality acoustic system.
We re-purpose the acoustic system for our side-channel attack. An
inaudible signal is emitted via speakers and the echo is recorded via
microphones turning the acoustic system of the phone into a sonar
system. Using this approach, an attacker that obtains control over a
phone’s speaker and microphone is able to observe user interaction,
such as the movement of the user’s fingers on the touch screen. As
the emitted sound is inaudible for the user, it is hard to detect that
the sound system is being used to gather information.
To illustrate the capability and potential of this novel active
acoustic side-channel attack, we use the task of stealing Andriod
unlock patterns as a case study. We choose this example, since
Android is a popular phone OS, and since its unlock patterns are
one of the most widely used authentication mechanisms. Previous
research investigated different methods for stealing unlock patterns,
e.g. by smudges [2], accelerometer reading [3] or video footage [29].
Our aim is to demonstrate the general viability of our new acoustic
side channel, not to improve the specific task of stealing unlock
patterns. It would be interesting future research to compare the
effectiveness of our approach with older methods, and to identify
the best method for stealing unlock patterns, but these are beyond
the scope of this paper.
It might appear that our contribution is merely another phone-
based side channel, among many of those that have been inves-
tigated for smartphones [23]. However, this is a false impression.
Although our experiments are carried out with a phone, the method
we show is applicable to many other kinds of computing devices
and physical environments where microphones and speakers are
available. Perhaps more importantly, when examined in the context
of acoustic attacks, our work is particularly significant in that it is
the first active acoustic side-channel to be reported.
Specific contributions of this paper include:
(1) SonarSnoop Framework: We establish the first active acoustic
side-channel attack and present SonarSnoop, the framework
of generic value to construct and implement such attacks.
(2) Unlock Pattern Stealing: We evaluate the performance of
SonarSnoop in stealing unlock patterns, and show that the
number of unlock patterns an attacker must try until a suc-
cessful authentication can be reduced by up to 70% using the
acoustic side-channel. This attack is entirely unnoticeable
to a victim; no noise and no vibration are induced.
(3) A family of security threats: We discuss a number of new
attack scenarios that extend our experiment setting.We show
that SonarSnoop represents a family of new threats.
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The next section describes relevant background on phone unlock
patterns, the acoustic side-channel and how to exploit it for an effec-
tive attack. Section 3 describes SonarSnoop, the system used to spy
on user interactions with a phone, discussing in detail the challeng-
ing aspects of signal generation and signal processing necessary
to reveal user interaction. Section 4 describes our experimental
evaluation using a user study. Specifically we evaluate the effec-
tiveness of different decision making strategies. Section 5 discusses
findings and limitations. Section 6 generalises the SonarSnoop at-
tack, discusses further attack scenarios, potential countermeasures
and broader implications of acoustic side-channel attacks. Section 7
describes related work and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 STEALING PHONE UNLOCK PATTERNS
VIA ACOUSTIC SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS
Unlock patterns are often used to secure access to Android phones.
We investigate a novel active acoustic side-channel attack to steal
these patterns.
2.1 Phone Unlock Patterns
We consider the unlock pattern mechanism available on Android
phones. The user is presented with a 3×3 grid of positions. Using the
touch screen the user has to draw a pattern, connecting positions
in the correct sequence to authenticate.
Figure 1 shows some examples of such an unlock pattern. For the
first pattern on the figure, the user has to connect 5 positions on
the screen in the correct order starting from the top left position.
The phone is blocked if the user fails to draw the correct pattern
five times in a short period.
The unlock pattern can be decomposed in multiple strokes which
are separated by inflections. Positions that can be reached with-
out changing drawing direction make up one stroke. We use this
approach of pattern decomposition later in the paper.
In theory there are 389, 112 ≈ 219 possible unlock patterns [26].
However, not every pattern is chosen by users with the same proba-
bility. Users have bias in choosing unlock patterns and models have
been created to estimate the likelihood of unlock patterns [26]. This
bias can be used by adversaries to improve their guess on unlock
patterns.
Figure 1 gives the 12 most common unlock patterns in the real
world, according to a recent empirical study [9]. In our user study,
we focus on stealing these most likely patterns only, for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, unlock patterns have a highly non-uniform
distribution, and those 12 common patterns account for more than
20% of user choices [9]. We aim for these high priority targets only,
just like rational adversaries often choose to do. Second, we aim
to make our user study reasonable to participants so that it will
not take too much of their time to complete the study. An overly
lengthy user study will be tedious and boring, and it will scare away
potential participants. In the worst scenario, a bored participant
can circumvent the study by producing useless data or otherwise
jeopardising our experiment’s validity. Third, as mentioned earlier,
our purpose is not to steal the most unlock patterns or propose the
best experiment of that kind. Instead, our modest aim is to use an
experiment to testify the feasibility of our acoustic side-channel
attack. We believe our design choice is sufficient for the purpose.
Strokes
Inflection
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
Figure 1: The twelve most popular unlock patterns according to [9].
An unlock pattern connects a number of dots, and it can be decom-
posed into several strokes separated by inflections.
Overall, our design choice is not a random decision, but one based
on careful deliberation, with multiple factors and their trade-off
taken into considerations.
2.2 An Acoustic Side-Channel
The acoustic channel can be used to infer user behaviour using
either a passive or active approach. A passive system assumes that
the observation target itself emits sound that can be recorded for
analysis. An active system uses speakers to emit a sound wave and
microphones to collect echo data.
In this work we use the active approach. The speakers of the sys-
tem emit an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
sound signal. We use OFDM because it has a good correlation prop-
erty [18] and it is easy to confine the signal to the higher inaudible
frequency range (see Section 3.3). The sound signal sits in a fre-
quency range that is inaudible to most people (18 kHz to 20 kHz).
The microphones are used to record the echo. By analysing the
recorded echo, it is possible to deduce user interaction patterns
with the touch screen.
When using this technique during a user’s interaction with the
unlock mechanism, information regarding the unlock pattern is
leaked which constitutes the acoustic side-channel.
2.3 Threat Model
We consider an adversary’s goal is to steal a user’s unlock pattern.
We assume that the adversary uses software deployed on the user’s
phone to achieve this goal. We further make the assumption that
the adversary uses the acoustic system (speakers and microphones)
on the phone to achieve this goal. We assume the adversary is able
to deploy code on the user’s phone which carries out the acoustic
side-channel attack.
Typically such code might be installed in form of a App. The
adversary may develop an App that incorporates code to execute
the acoustic side-channel attack and presents itself to the user as
a benign App such as a Weather App or a Game. The existence
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of Apps with such hidden malicious functionality in the Android
Marketplace is well documented [31, 32].
The App will require access to microphones. The user will be
asked to grant access to this when the application is first launched.
Users often grant such access as they rarely question the necessity
of these requests [12]. In addition, the App might be designed such
that this permission seems reasonable to the user. For example, the
App might have sound effects and offer voice control.
To be effective, the App will have to be active when the user
enters the unlock pattern. Thus, the App has to be running in the
background and become active when the phone starts.
The App may also make use of available communication chan-
nels to transport observed data to a back-end system. The back-
end system can be used to analyse the acoustic traces, avoiding
suspicious heavy computation on the user’s phone. Again, such
communication falls within normal operational behaviour of Apps
and would not raise suspicion.
The acoustic system is specific to the phone model. Different
phones provide a different number of speakers and microphones
and they are placed differently. Thus, an active acoustic side-channel
attack must be tuned to the model of the phone. We assume that
the adversary is able to obtain the same phone model as used by
the target in order to adjust signal processing parameters to the
target environment.
2.4 Attack Success
An adversary is successful if he or she has: (i) deployed malicious
code on the target’s phone; (ii) collected sufficient data from the
acoustic side-channel during the users’ interaction with the unlock
mechanism; (iii) analysed the data and extracted unlock pattern
candidates; and (iv) the number of extracted pattern candidates is
smaller than the number of trials the OS allows.
The challenging parts of this attack sequence include collecting
useful data from the acoustic side-channel and designing a data
analysis framework for inferring unlock patterns. The next sections
will focus on these elements. We consider the deployment of mali-
cious code on a target’s phone a solved problem, as is the common
practice in the literature [31, 32].
3 SONARSNOOP
This section describes SonarSnoop, our framework to execute an
acoustic side-channel attack on the Android phone unlock pattern.
We call the framework SonarSnoop as we use the acoustic detection
to snoop on user interaction, bearing similarities with sonar sys-
tems. The system is geared towards unlock patterns; however, by
exchanging elements of the signal processing and decision making
components the system could be re-purposed for other side-channel
attacks such as observing user interaction with a banking App.
Our work is inspired by FingerIO [18] which is a system for user
interaction based on active acoustic sonar. However, FingerIO is
used to track movement of gestures in the vicinity of a phone while
our system requires to track finger movement on the screen. Thus
in SonarSnoop, the close proximity and the fact that the user also
holds the phone during interaction provides additional complexity.
We also modify the signal generation and processing for our device
and application scenario.
The speakers of the phone send an inaudible OFDM sound signal
which all objects around the phone reflect. The microphones receive
the signal and also the reflections (delayed copies of the signal).
The time of arrival of all echoes does not change when objects
are static. However, when an object (a finger) is moving a shift in
arrival times is observed. The received signals are represented by a
so called echo profile matrix which visualises this shift and allows
us to observe movement. Combining observed movement from
multiple microphones allows us to estimate strokes and inflections
(see Figure 1). By combining the estimated sequence of observed
strokes, we can then estimate the unlock pattern they represent.
The four main components of SonarSnoop are:
• Signal Generation: Using the speakers of the phone an OFDM
signal is produced. The signal is inaudible and suitable for
close-range tracking of fingers.
• Data Collection: Data is collected via the device’s micro-
phones.
• Signal Processing: Echo profiles are created followed by re-
moval of noise and artefacts. Then features (fingermovement
direction and distance) are extracted.
• Decision Making: Using the extracted features the unlock
patterns (represented by their decomposition in strokes and
inflections) are discovered. We provide alternative methods
to do this.
3.1 Signal Generation
Signal generation is based on FingerIO [18] with modifications
tailored to our device and application scenario. We introduce some
additional processing and filtering steps.
Identical to FingerIO, 48 kHz is used as the sampling frequency.
According to Nyquist Theorem, this supports a sound wave of up to
24 kHz. This importantly supports frequencies above 18 kHz, which
is the highest frequency most adults can hear. A vector comprising
64 subcarriers, each covering 375Hz, is composed. All subcarriers
outside of the intended band (18 kHz − 20 kHz) are set to 0, and all
others are set to 1.
The next signal generation steps are in addition to themechanism
used by FingerIO and are used to adjust to our phone and application
scenario. A copy of the vector is reverse ordered, and the two vectors
concatenated, resulting in the vector shown in Figure 2a. The 128-
sample time domain signal is generated using the Inverse Fast
Fourier transform (IFFT). The real part is divided in half, and the
first half used as the signal. As this introduces spectral leakage into
the audible hearing range we remove unwanted low-frequencies
using a Hanning window. The final signal in the time domain is
shown in Figure 2b. The signal is padded with silence to introduce
a 264-sample interval, and a duration of 5.5ms. This ensures that
all echoes are captured before the next pulse is emitted. The frame
is repeated continuously, producing a signal as shown in Figure 3.
We expect that further optimisation is possible. However, we
found the performance to be sufficient for our work.
3.2 Data Collection
The phone’s microphones are used to record sound data using a
sampling frequency of 48 kHz. Noise is introduced by the envi-
ronment and is recorded together with the received OFDM signal.
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Figure 2: Sonar signal generation. (a) 128-point vector in frequency
domain and (b) 64-point signal in time domain.
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Figure 3: The sound frame as played continuously over the speak-
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Figure 4: The process describes the transformation of the audio sig-
nal into the echo profile vector and finally the echo profile matrix.
However, ambient noise does not interfere excessively with the
signal processing stage.
3.3 Signal Processing
Signal processing comprises (i) echo profile generation, (ii) noise
removal, and (iii) feature extraction.
Echo Profile Creation. Echo data is recorded and transformed
into an echo profile for each present microphone. The processing
for each microphone is the same, except for parameter settings
taking into account the positioning of microphones in relation to
movement locations. Most modern phones provide at least two
microphones, one on top of the phone and one on the bottom; we
tailor the following process to two microphones but the described
methods can be extended to more microphone inputs.
We create the echo profile by calculating the correlation between
the original sound frame and the echo data (see Figure 4). The orig-
inal sound frame is a 64-point signal (64 sample points in the time
domain over a duration of 1.3ms). Therefore, we take 64-point sized
chunks from the recorded echo data and apply a sliding window,
shifting 1-point at a time, and calculating the correlation with the
original sound frame. Each correlation result is then concatenated
to create the echo profile vector.
The data emitted on the speakers consist of periodical 264-point
long sound frames, and echoes are observed within this period.
When there is no object movement, echoes will be observed at the
same time within each 264-point frame. When objects move, echo
positions will change within each following 264-point frame. This
can be visualised by transforming the echo profile vector into an
echo profile matrix. We take 264-point sized chunks from the echo
profile vector and transpose them to create the echo profile matrix.
Figure 5a shows an example echo profile matrix. The x-axis and
y-axis of the matrix correspond to time and distance, respectively.
When an object moves, slight variations comparing one column
of the echo profile matrix to the next can be observed. Depending on
the microphone location in relation to the movement and the speed
of moving objects, it is necessary to compare column i with column
i + δ to see clear changes. For the phone used in our experiments
we set δ = 8 (44ms separation) for the bottom microphone and
δ = 16 (88ms separation) for the top microphone. We chose these
values as they provided the best performance for our application
case. Figure 5b shows an example of the echo profile matrix after
subtraction of values in column i and i + δ . The finger movements
are now clearly visible and can be analysed by suitable algorithms.
Noise Removal . Before analysing data captured in the echo pro-
file matrix, noise is removed. We consider here noise from the sonar
system and not ambient sound, because such ambient noise does
not correlate with our original signal and therefore does not inter-
fere with the sonar signal analysis. An example result of this clean
up procedure is shown in Figure 5c which corresponds to the data
shown in Figure 5b.
First, we transform the echo profile matrix into a binary matrix
by setting values above a threshold to 1 and below to 0. Thus,
only correlation above the threshold is taken into account as this
corresponds to significant movements. The threshold is chosen as
the 94th percentile of all the values in the matrix. We found that
this threshold setting performs well in the context of our work.
We use image processing techniques to extract features from the
echo profile matrix. Thus, our next step of noise removal is tailored
to this method of feature extraction. We use the concept of Con-
nected Components (CCs) to detect areas of activity (corresponding
to strokes) in the binary echo profile matrix. Each CC is defined as
area containing more than 20 connected 1s. We remove all 1s from
our echo profile matrix that are not included in such CCs. Again, a
threshold of 20 was found to be suitable for our application context.
Feature Extraction. We use the CCs to locate areas of movement
in the binary echo profile matrix. Each CC is described by a Bound-
ing Box (BB) which is the smallest rectangle surrounding the CC
as shown in Figure 5c. CCs that identify one stroke are grouped
4
50
100
150
200
250
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
(a)
50
100
150
200
250
-5
0
5
1010
-4
(b)
50
100
150
200
250
(c)
Figure 5: (a) Raw echo profile matrix. (b) Echo profile matrix after
column-wise subtraction. (c) Echo profile matrix after binarisation
and segmentation; blue-coloured bounding boxes indicate detected
strokes.
together. For each group of CCs we extract two features: (i) move-
ment direction and (ii) movement distance. Movement direction
relates to the angle of lines visible in the CCs of a group. Movement
distance relates to the height of BBs in each group.
Before extracting features we exclude some CCs.We remove CCs
that are only visible on one microphone input; movement should
be detected clearly by both microphones at the same time. We also
remove overlapping CCs when more than half of the smaller CC
overlaps in x and y direction. Thus, the number of CC within a
group is reduced, simplifying analysis without loosing accuracy.
CCs are assigned to groups by using a separation of 80 columns
(i.e., by 440ms) on the x axis. A user pauses between strokes and we
use this separation to group CCs belonging to the same stroke. This
method relies on a visible pause at inflections. Other data analysis
methods need to be used to determine CC groups when this cue
is not present. We did experiments during which a user does not
need to pause at each inflection. The results remain similar only
except CCs of different strokes connect together. This fact does not
invalidate our approach but additional image processing techniques
are in need to separate these CCs.
Objects moving away from a microphone produce an ascending
trend in the CC, while objects moving towards produce a descend-
ing trend. Figure 6 gives an example of this behaviour pattern; two
strokes captured by the bottom microphone are shown. The CC in
Figure 6b has an ascending trend, and the CC in Figure 6d has a
descending trend. To identify these trends automatically we use a
Top Mic
Bottom Mic
(a) (b)
Top Mic
Bottom Mic
(c) (d)
Figure 6: Two strokes with different direction information. (a) A
stroke that is moving away from the bottom microphone. (b) Con-
nected Components (CC) of the stroke shown in a extracted from
the bottom microphone. It shows an ascending trend. (c) A stroke
that is moving towards the bottommicrophone. (d) CC of the stroke
in c extracted from the bottom microphone. It shows a descending
trend.
Greater than
90°
Connected
Components
Bounding
Box
Figure 7: The relation between the ascending trend of a Connected
Component and the angle (orientation) result of Gabor filter.
Gabor filter [25], which is a well-known linear filter and often used
for extracting orientation information. We quantify the orientation
(i.e. the angle) of lines within the CC in each BB using Gabor filter.
If the angle is greater than 90° as shown in Figure 7, it means that an
object is moving away from a microphone; while an angle smaller
than 90° means that an object is moving towards the microphone.
After obtaining the angle information of each BB belonging to a
stroke we combine these into a single value. We weigh the angle
information of each CC by the size of the BB. In the remainder of
the paper, we call this feature representing a stroke’s direction the
angle.
Movement distance can be inferred from the heights of the BBs
within a group. As a group corresponds to a stroke in our case, the
height of each BB contributes to the movement distance of a stroke.
If the stroke is long, the BBs covers more space vertically. In the
remainder of the paper we refer to this feature as the range.
3.4 Decision Making
SonarSnoop gathers stroke information via the features angle and
range. This information has to be translated into a meaningful user
interaction pattern. Depending on the application, very different
decision making processes can be appropriate.
We consider in this paper only the task of stealing phone unlock
patterns as described in Section 2.3. For this purpose we define 3
different decision making options named D1, D2, D3 which operate
very differently.
• D1 simply uses the features angle and range and classifies
each stroke. The resulting sequence of strokes is then the
assumed unlock pattern of the user.
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Figure 8: The 15 strokes used to compose the 12 unlock patterns
shown in Figure 1.
Patterns Bottom Mic. Patterns Top Mic.
1, 4, 7, 8 A - T 1,2,4,5,8,11 A - A
2, 5, 6, 11 T - A 3, 10 A - A - A
3, 10 A - T - A 6, 7 A - T
9 A - T - A - A 9 A - A - A - T
12 A - T - T 12 A - A - T
Table 1: Groups of patterns that have the same number of strokes
with the same behaviours when using one microphone. Behaviours
are shown as A if the stroke is moving away from the microphone,
and T if the stroke is moving towards to the microphone.
• D2 uses only the angle feature of strokes. The sequence
of directions reveals a set of candidate patterns. The set
of candidate patterns is likely to contain the user’s unlock
pattern.
• D3 combines D2 and D1. First, a set of candidates is deter-
mined by investigating the angle feature of strokes. Then
within the candidate set angle and range are used to classify
strokes and identify the user’s pattern.
Users do change unlock patterns infrequently and once mali-
cious software is deployed on a phone multiple unlock procedures
can be observed. For each observed unlock procedure the decision
making process provides one or more candidate pattern. All pro-
posed candidate patterns are ordered according to the number of
times they were suggested. The position of the user’s pattern in the
list of suggested patterns determines the effectiveness of the side
channel attack.
D1 - Classifying Strokes using Angle and Range. We classify the
strokes using machine learning. The sequence of classified strokes
reveals the unlock pattern. We use the 12 most likely unlock pattern
as shown in Figure 1 which decompose into 15 unique strokes as
shown in Figure 8. Sample data for each of the 15 strokes from
2 individuals (trainers) is used to train the classifier. Trainers are
not subjects of the user study. We use the direction (angle) and
distance (range) of the strokes obtained from the echo data of both
microphones.
There are 3 variants of this decisionmaking process: (D1.1) using
data from both microphones; (D1.2) using data from the bottom
microphone only; (D1.3) using data from the top microphone only.
Patterns Bottom Microphone Top Microphone
1, 4, 8 A - T A - A
2, 5, 11 T - A A - A
3, 10 A - T - A A - A - A
6 T - A A - T
7 A - T A - T
9 A - T - A - A A - A - A - T
12 A - T - T A - A - T
Table 2: Groups of patterns that have the same number of strokes
with the same behaviours when using both microphones. Be-
haviours are shown as A if the stroke is moving away from the mi-
crophone, and T if the stroke is moving towards to themicrophone.
D2 - Grouping Patterns using Angle . For this method we use
only the direction (angle) of a stroke, whether it is moving towards
a microphone or away. Then we look at the combination of the
strokes to guess the pattern. For example, the first stroke of the
Pattern 1 in Figure 1 is moving away from the bottom microphone
and the second stroke is moving towards the bottom microphone.
Pattern 4 , Pattern 7 and Pattern 8 have the same behaviour from the
perspective of the bottom microphone. Therefore, using only angle
information, a group of patterns is identified. Table 1 shows pattern
groups for each microphone that have the same stroke behaviour
when considering patterns as shown in Figure 1.
The group sizes can be reduced by considering data from both
microphones together. For example, the first stroke of the Pattern 1
in Fig 1 ismoving away from the bottommicrophone and the second
stroke is moving towards the bottom microphone; considering the
top microphone the first and second stroke are moving away from
microphone. Only Pattern 4 and Pattern 8 have this same behaviour.
Table 2 shows pattern groups that have the same stroke behaviour.
It may happen that the analysis of stroke patterns using angle
information of both microphones is inconclusive. For example, the
strokes from the top microphone are reported as moving towards
and moving towards, and the strokes from the bottom microphone
are reported as moving away and moving towards. In this case, no
group mapping exists as the combination cannot be mapped to any
entry in Table 2. In such situation where no match is possible we
choose to fall back on data collected from one microphone.
We use four strategies to operate this decision making process:
(D2.1) using data from both microphones, using only the bottom
microphone in inconclusive situations; (D2.2) using data from both
microphones, using only the top microphone in inconclusive situa-
tions; (D2.3) using data from the bottom microphone only; (D2.4)
using data from the top microphone only.
D3 - Grouping Patterns using Angle and Classifying Strokes using
Angle and Range . We combine the first two approaches to improve
the overall accuracy. We first use method D2 to identify a pat-
tern group, then we select a specific pattern from this group using
method D1. This approach improves on using D1 alone as the pool
of candidate patterns is reduced before machine learning is applied.
We train machine learning models for the strokes of each group
using corresponding microphone’s data.
Similar to method D2, four different operation modes can be
used: (D3.1) using data from both microphones, using only the bot-
tom microphone in inconclusive situations; (D3.2) using data from
both microphones, using only the top microphone in inconclusive
6
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Figure 9: Galaxy S4 used in the experiments. (a) Location of the bot-
tom speaker and the bottom microphone. (b) Location of the top
speaker and the top microphone. (c) Simplified reflection paths of
the bottom speaker (SB), the top speaker (ST), the echo coming to
the bottommicrophone (EB), and the echo coming to the top micro-
phone (ET).
(a) (b)
Figure 10: (a) Screenshot of the App used for our user study. (b) An
example demonstration of the user study.
situations; (D3.3) using data from the bottom microphone only;
(D3.4) using data from the top microphone only.
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF
SONARSNOOP
We evaluate SonarSnoop using a Samsung Galaxy S4 running An-
droid 5.0.1. A dedicated evaluation App is used for a user study to
prompt users to input unlock patterns which we then aim to reveal
using SonarSnoop.
4.1 User Study
The Samsung Galaxy S4 provides two speakers and two micro-
phones as shown in Figure 9. We execute the data collection com-
ponent of SonarSnoop on the phone. Signal generation, signal pro-
cessing and decision making are executed on a dedicated PC.
For the experiments we develop a dedicated evaluation App
instead of using the built-in pattern unlock mechanism of Android.
The App replicates the pattern unlock mechanism and provides
additional features to simplify evaluation. The App provides the
user with a 9-point matrix to enter unlock patterns. In addition, the
user interface shows the pattern we expect the user to draw. The
user interface is shown in Figure 10a. The evaluation App guides a
user through the experiment and ensures that echo data recorded
by SonarSnoop can be matched with the pattern the user was asked
to draw (ground truth).
We ran a user study with 10 volunteers (we obtained approval for
the study from the University Ethics Committee). Each volunteer
was asked to draw the 12 unlock patterns as shown in Figure 1
five times. The evaluation App guided the volunteers through this
process which took up to 30 minutes.
The participant is asked to hold the phone with one hand and to
draw the pattern with the other. The participants sat at a table and
rest the arm holding the phone with their elbow on the table (see
Figure 10b).
All experimentation was carried in an open plan office without
restrictions on the environment noise. During our experiment usual
office noise was present (people moving, chatting, moving chairs,
opening doors). The results shows that our approach is fairly robust
against such environment noise.
4.2 Evaluation Metrics
Using the data collected in our user study we evaluate the three
different variants of our decision making process. To judge perfor-
mance we use five key metrics:
• Pattern guess rate per user (M1): For each user we calculate
the ratio of successfully retrieved patterns to the number
of patterns in the pool (i.e., 12). A pattern is successfully
retrieved if the decision making suggests a set of patterns
which contains the correct one.
• Pattern candidates per user (M2): Without the aid of our
side-channel attack, the attacker must perform a random
guess (i.e. selecting randomly from a pool of 12 patterns
in our case). This metric describes the average size of the
pattern pool after the decision making per user. If the size
of the remaining pattern candidate pool is reduced, it will
improve pattern guess rate.
• Pattern guess rate per pattern (M3): This metric is similar
to M1. However, the rate of success is per pattern instead of
per user. The metric shows how successful a specific pattern
is retrieved across all users within our study.
• Pattern candidates per pattern (M4): This metric is similar to
M2. Here the average size of the pattern pool after decision
making is calculated per pattern across all users in the study.
• Attack attempts (M5): This metric is based on M2. However,
the unlock patterns are ordered by the number of times
they were suggested. This gives the sequence of patterns an
attacker will try. M5 is the position of the user’s pattern in
this ordered pattern pool.
4.3 Decision Making Option D1
With this decision making variant we classify the individual strokes
of the patterns and then deduce the pattern from the result (see
Section 3.4). Figure 8 shows the 15 unique strokes of the 12 patterns
shown in Figure 1 which are elements of our study. We train our
machine learning model using data obtained from 2 trainers. We
collect between 30 and 40 samples in total for each stroke. We test
various algorithms using 5-fold cross validation on the training
data, and pick Medium Gaussian SVM algorithm with kernel scale
parameter 2.2, as it performs best among other algorithms in terms
of accuracy.
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Figure 11: Classification accuracies for 15 strokes shown in Figure 8
for 10 users.
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Figure 12: Results per user with decision method D1. (a) Pattern
guess rate (Metric M1). (b) Average number of pattern candidates
remained after predictions (Metric M2).
Figure 11 shows the classification accuracies for the 15 strokes
shown in Figure 8 for 10 users that participated in our study. The
figure shows accuracies for each user with different combinations
of feature sets. Using both microphones gives the best performance
as we would expect. The highest accuracy value of 0.37 is achieved
with User 8 when using both microphones. We obtain the best
overall average accuracy when using both microphones (Accuracy
of 0.29).
Next we combine the classified strokes to guess the users’ pattern.
Figure 12a shows the pattern guess rate per user (Metric M1). The
rate is shown using variation D1.1, D1.2 and D1.3 of our decision
making method D1. As a reflection of the results shown Figure 11,
we obtain the best rate of 0.33 for User 8 when using data from both
microphones, and the best average value of 0.18 across all users is
also achieved when using both microphones.
Figure 12b shows the average number of candidate patterns re-
mained after predictions for each user (Metric M2). A minimum
number of candidates of 8.83 is achieved when using both micro-
phones for User 8, and we obtain the minimum average value of
10.28 when using both microphone across the user population.
Figure 13a shows pattern guess rate across all users for each
pattern (Metric M3). Although the average rate of 0.18 is achieved
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Figure 13: Results per pattern with decision method D1. (a) Pattern
guess rate (Metric M3). (b) Average number of pattern candidates
remained after predictions (Metric M4).
when using both microphones, Pattern 5 is revealed for 9 users
within 5 iterations.
Figure 13b shows the average number of candidates remained
after predictions for each pattern (Metric M4). The minimum value
of 3.20 is achieved with Pattern 5 when using both microphones.
We obtain the minimum average value of 10.28 when using both
microphones.
Summary. The results show that method D1 reduces the can-
didate pool of patterns (Metrics M2, M4). Thus, we show that the
acoustic side-channel is generally useful to an attacker. However,
the improvement is not very significant. The average number of
candidate patterns for the attacker to try is reduced from 12 to 10.28
(Metrics M2, M4).
4.4 Decision Making Option D2
With this decision making variant we identify candidate groups
based on the angle information. Some patterns share the same
number of movements with the same behaviours (moving away or
moving towards), and we cannot narrow the decision down to a
single pattern.
Table 2 shows groups of patterns that have the same number of
movements with same behaviours when using both microphones.
The rates (Metric M1) as shown in Figure 14a are above 0.83
for all users when using both microphones (D2.1 and D2.2). The
patterns of Users 2, 6, 7, 8 and 10 are mapped to their groups shown
in Table 2 with 100% success when using both microphones, and
the best average value of 0.93 for M1 is achieved when using both
microphones (D2.1 and D2.2).
The minimum number of candidates as shown in Figure 14b
(Metric M2) of 3.50 is achieved for User 2, and we obtain the mini-
mum average value of 4.44 when using only bottom microphone’s
data (D2.3).
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Figure 14: Results per user with decision method D2. (a) Pattern
guess rate (Metric M1). (b) Average number of pattern candidates
remained after predictions (Metric M2).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Patterns
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
R
at
e
D2.1
D2.2
D2.3
D2.4
(a)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Patterns
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
N
um
be
r o
f C
an
di
da
te
s D2.1
D2.2
D2.3
D2.4
(b)
Figure 15: Results per pattern with decision method D2. (a) Pattern
guess rate (Metric M3). (b) Average number of pattern candidates
remained after predictions (Metric M4).
Most of the patterns are mapped to their correct groups (Metric
M3 shown in Figure 15a), and an overall average value of 0.93 is
achieved when using the data from both microphones (D2.1 and
D2.2).
The average number of candidates remained after predictions for
each pattern are shown in Figure 15b (Metric M4). Aminimum value
of 2.30 is achieved for Pattern 12 when using both microphones
and the bottom microphone is dominant (D2.1). We obtain the
minimum average value when using only the bottom microphone
(D2.3) which is 4.44.
Both Microphones Bottom Microphone Top Microphone
Patterns Strokes Patterns Strokes Patterns Strokes
1, 4, 8 2, 5, 6 1, 4, 6, 8 2, 5, 6, 9 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11 1, 3, 5, 14
2, 5, 11 3, 5, 14 2, 5, 6, 11 3, 5, 7, 14 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11 2, 4, 5, 6
3, 10 1, 11 2, 5, 6, 11 4, 8 3, 10 1, 11
3, 10 5, 12 3, 10 1, 11 3, 10 5, 12
3, 10 4, 13 3, 10 5, 12 3, 10 4, 13
3, 10 4, 13 6, 7 1, 7
6, 7 8, 9
Table 3: Groups of unique strokes to be trained for each pattern
groupwhen using bothmicrophones, only bottommicrophone, and
only top microphone.
Summary. D2 performs significantly better than D1. The number
of pattern candidates is significantly reduced from 12 to 4.4 (Metrics
M2, M4). This is an interesting result as this method uses only one
feature (angle) for the decision making. However, the attacker still
has more than one candidate due to similarities of patterns and
their grouping.
4.5 Decision Making Option D3
Here we first map a pattern into a group of patterns by looking
at the directions using method D2. The results are then narrowed
down further by classifying the unique strokes of the patterns
within a group. For this classification machine learning models for
each group are required. For method D1 we had 15 different strokes
that need training for the decision making method D1. For the
method D3, the number of unique strokes within each group is less
than 15, which will be less challenging for the machine learning
models. Therefore, we expected that the algorithm performance
will be better than the one in Section 4.3.
The groups of patterns that have the same number of strokes
with the same behaviours are shown in Table 2. These groups are
created using the data of both microphones. For the method D3, we
sometimes use only one of themicrophone’s data as fall-back. There-
fore, we need to take into account the patterns that are grouped
together when using only one of the microphone’s data, which
are shown in Table 1. We analyse the patterns within each group
shown in Tables 1 and 2, then filter out the common strokes of all
patterns within this group and only list the unique strokes within
each group. For instance, Strokes 2, 5, and 6 are unique for each pat-
tern (Pattern 1, 4, and 8) of the first group shown in Table 2. Unique
stroke groups to be trained for each pattern group when using both
microphones, only bottom microphone, and only top microphone
are shown in Table 3. We create machine learning models for the
strokes of each group using the corresponding microphone’s data.
Various machine learning algorithms are applied to training data
using 5-fold cross validation, and Medium Gaussian SVM algorithm
with kernel scale parameter 2.2 is chosen for decision making over
users’ data.
D3 is an extension of D2 and therefore the rates achieved (Metric
M1 and M3) are the same for D2 and D3. However, the additional
processing after identifying candidate sets reduces the pattern can-
didate sets further (Metric M2 and M4). We therefore present next
the results regarding M2 and M4.
The average number of candidates remained after predictions for
each user (Metric M2) are shown in Figure 16. A minimum number
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Figure 16:Average number of pattern candidates remained after pre-
dictions for each user (Metric M2) with decision method D3.
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Figure 17:Average number of pattern candidates remained after pre-
dictions for each pattern (Metric M4) with decision method D3.
of candidates of 2.5 is achieved for User 8. We obtain the minimum
average value of 3.6 for D3.1 when looking across all users.
Figure 17 shows the average number of candidates remained after
predictions for each pattern (Metric M4). The minimum number
of candidates of 1 is achieved for Patterns 1 and 11 when using
the data from both microphones (D3.1 and D3.2), which means we
just need one attempt to guess these two patterns. We obtain the
minimum average value of 3.6 using method D3.1.
Summary. Using this method we can reduce the pattern candi-
date pool in some cases from 12 to 1 (Metric M4). When looking
across all patterns, this method D3 improves on D2. The number
of pattern candidates is reduced from 4.4 to 3.6 (Metric M2 and
M4). Moreover, the average attack attempt value of 2.71 is achieved
when using method D3.2 (Metric M5).
5 DISCUSSIONS
Our experimental evaluation shows that the acoustic side-channel
is in principle a useful instrument for revealing user interaction
patterns on phones. However, our study and the components of
SonarSnoop have limitations and improvements are possible.
5.1 Algorithm Performance
D1 is the most generic method, identifying individual strokes and
composing these into patterns. The method helps to reduce an at-
tackers effort in guessing the unlock pattern. However, the method
does not yield very good results. The average number of candidate
patterns the attacker has to try is reduced from 12 to 10.28.
D2 is much better and provides an average reduction from 12 to
4.4 patterns. This result is achieved by analysing less features from
the collected sound data than method D1 (based only on direction
of finger movement). However, D2 requires us to decide on a pool
of patterns beforehand. This is a limitation D1 is not bound to;
however, in practice this may not be problematical as the pool of
likely patterns is known [9].
D3 improves on D2 by combining D1 and D2. Patterns are
grouped and thereafter the method used in D1 is applied to narrow
down the pattern candidate pool further. D3 provides an average
reduction from 12 to 3.6 pattern (D2 reduces these from 12 to 4.4).
Although D3 requires reasonably more computational effort, it
gives better results than D2.
5.2 Limitations and Improvements
The acoustic signal generation can be improved. We believe it is
possible to reduce the silence period in between pulses to achieve
better resolution. The current gap size between pulses ensures
reflections can be received from up to 1m distance before the next
pulse is emitted. Given that we are interested in movement on the
screen in close proximity we can reduce this gap. Also, different
signal shapes might be possible that improve system performance.
For convenience and simplicity, we do not implement the system
to cope with different users interaction speeds. We use a fixed
column width of the echo profile matrix to determine if there is
movement. We calibrated the system to work well with most users.
However, if a user draws a pattern very slowly, the differential echo
profile matrix may not reveal movements, since the rate of change is
too slow to be detected. An improved implementation could support
an adaptive feature to adjust with vastly different interaction speeds.
Nevertheless, our method is applicable for practical scenarios since
we have observed that people draw patterns consistently fast.
We proposed three decision making strategies. The algorithms
sufficiently demonstrate that the active acoustic side-channel at-
tack is feasible. However, we believe it is possible to design better
decision making strategies. For example, additional features could
be extracted from the recorded sound data to provide a better basis
for decisions. Also, different methods for analysing the existing
features (angle and direction) are possible.
SonarSnoop in its current form relies on clear separation of
strokes within a pattern. When users do not pause at an inflection
it is currently impossible to distinguish individual strokes. In our
user study we asked users to pause at inflections. We aim to ex-
tend the system with methods for automatic separation of strokes.
This can be achieved by analysing angle changes within individual
Connected Component (CC).
Our user study has limitations. We had 10 users that were asked
to draw 12 patterns 5 times. While the study provided sufficient
data to analyse SonarSnoop, it would be useful to expand the data
set, e.g. with a greater variety of patterns and with these entered
more than 5 times by the users.
6 ATTACK GENERALISATION AND
COUNTERMEASURES
SonarSnoop can do more than stealing unlock patterns on phones.
This approach can be applied to other scenarios and device types,
and SonarSnoop represents a new family of security threats.
6.1 Attack Generalisation
SonarSnoop can be expanded to support different interactions and
device types.
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SonarSnoop can be extended to observe different user interac-
tions such as gestures or typing on a phone’s virtual keyboard.
Recognising simple gestures (such as swipe left or right as used
for Tinder) would be relatively simple to discern while identifying
different key presses on a keyboard is more challenging. Adaptation
to different interaction types will enable new side-channel attacks
on specific applications.
Our experiment observes user interactions with a touch screen.
However, SonarSnoop can be extended to observe user behaviour
in some distance to the phone. For example, FingerIO has used
a similar approach to observe gestures a meter away from the
speaker/microphone. Thus, a phone could be used to observe user
interaction with a device (e.g. an ATM) other than the phone itself.
In our study, acoustic emitter and receiver are located in the same
device, and situations where these two components are separate
should be considered. It is not uncommon that phones are just put
aside people’s laptops when they work. In this case, speakers on
the phone can act as emitter while microphones on the laptop can
work as receiver, or vice versa. Similarly, devices do not need to be
limited only to phones and laptops. Any devices with microphones
and speakers such as tablets and phones, smart watches, cameras
or voice assistants are candidates.
6.2 New Attack Scenarios
We envisage a number of new attack scenarios that extend our
experiment.
Stealing personal preferences.Tinder, the popular social search
App, helps strangers to socialise with each other. It supports a filter
mechanism that two people can only start chatting if they both
like each other’s profile picture. Tinder treats a user’s ‘right swipe’
actions as like, and ‘left swipe’ as dislike. These swipe actions can
be easily differentiated by SonarSnoop.
More and more human gestures are incorporated into the so-
called natural user interaction with various computing devices.
Our Tinder attack suggests numerous new possibilities for stealing
people’s sensitive personal preferences via spying on their gestures.
Combo attacks. SonarSnoop can be extended to use additional
sensor inputs to boost performance. The combination of multiple
sensing inputs has been used successfully in the past. For instance,
Simon et al. make use of the front phone camera and microphone
recording to infer Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) [22]. They
use the front camera to record a video when people input, by tap-
ping on the screen, PINs. The recorded acoustic signal helps to
identify frames in which a PIN is entered. Machine learning is used
to identify the pressed number in the identified frames. Narain et al.
combine a gyroscope and microphone to unveil PINs [20]. Sound
and gyroscopes data is used to detect finger tap location on the
virtual keyboard or PIN pad.
SonarSnoop can be augmented similarly. For example, data from
sensors such as gyroscopes, accelerometers or cameras could be
combined with the active sonar approach. It is also possible to
use a combination of approaches based on the acoustic channel.
Specifically, active and passive approaches can be combined. If
passive and our active acoustic side-channel analyses are combined,
tapping information (timing and location) and finger movement
information (movement distance and movement direction between
taps) can be extracted. Such more fine grained data collection will
allow us to infer user interaction with greater detail.
Espionage. Installing hidden acoustic bugs say in an embassy
has been a common practice in the intelligence community. This old-
fashioned eavesdroppingmethod, when combinedwith SonarSnoop,
will have new advantages. First, the combined use turns a passive
eavesdropping into an active one. Second, cautious people know
the necessity of playing loud music or otherwise introducing back-
ground noise to mitigate the eavesdropping bugs. However, this
common countermeasure does little to defend against SonarSnoop,
since it is robust to ambient noise.
6.3 Countermeasures
The main feature that enable SonarSnoop is the transmission and
reception of inaudible sound. Different hardware and software
solutions are possible to interfere with this feature and to prevent
an acoustic active side-channel attack.
Sound System Design. Devices could be constructed such that
transmission of inaudible signals is simply impossible. After all, the
intended purpose of a speaker system is to communicate with peo-
ple who should be able to hear the sound. Supporting the very high
frequency range might be useful for high-quality sound systems
(e.g. concert halls) but is perhaps unnecessary for simple appliances
(e.g. phones or smart TVs). The frequency range that the hardware
supports can be restricted to mitigate the threat of SonarSnoop, but
this is not viable for already existing systems.
SoundNotification. Software or hardware can be used to notify
users of a present sound signal in the high frequency range. Users
can be alerted by an LED or by a pop-up notification. This can
enable users to realise an active side-channel’s presence.
Jamming. Another option is to actively disable side channels.
Jamming can actively render side channels useless to an attacker.
For example, Nandakumar et al. proposed to jam acoustic signals
in the inaudible range [19]. A device can be designed to monitor
acoustic channel activities and, once a threat situation is detected,
enable jamming. Alternatively, application software can actively
generate noise within the acoustic channel when sensitive tasks
are executed (e.g. when a banking App requests a PIN).
Sound System Off Switch. A sound system (or either micro-
phones or speakers individually) could be disabled during sensitive
operations. Either the device provides features that allows software
to disable the sound system when needed or a method is provided
that allows the user to disable it. For example, a device could provide
a switch (the equivalent to a mechanical camera cover) to enable
users to control the capability of the device.
Among these countermeasures, no single method fits in all sit-
uations. Probably a standalone appliance which can jam in the
inaudible frequency range has a best defence capability. However,
this approach might not be very user friendly as people need carry
an extra device with them.
6.4 Wider Impact
A core attacker activity is to study user interaction with systems.
The simplest approach here is to follow a victim and observe their
actions, for example, to observe a victim entering a PIN code at
an ATM. However, people are quite aware that this might happen
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and take precautions. An attacker therefore may use a more covert
approach and may use a camera for observation. Either a camera is
deployed for this purpose or an existing camera is re-purposed for
this task. For example, the attacker places a camera on the ATM or
uses existing CCTV equipment. However, people have also become
aware of this attacker approach and are cautious. It is common
practice to cover camera lenses on a laptop with a sticker and to be
aware of cameras when performing sensitive tasks.
Most devices, including numerous IoT systems have nowadays a
high-end acoustic system. Phones, smart TVs, voice assistants such
as Alexa and Google Home have multiple high-end speakers and
microphones incorporated. As our study has demonstrated, it is
possible to use these systems to gather very detailed information
on user behaviour. The information is not yet as detailed as what is
possible with optical systems but sufficient to obtain very detailed
behaviour profiles. Users are not aware of the capability of sound
systems. You would not consider that the presence of a sound
system is problematic when carrying out sensitive tasks. People
may be wary that conversations are recorded but they certainly
lack awareness that the sound system can be used for observation
of movements.
Clearly, this type of threat should be considered. People need to
be made aware and the threat should be considered when designing
systems.
7 RELATEDWORK
Our work is the first to propose an active acoustic side-channel
attack. It can be a side-channel on phones, and on other computing
devices where speakers and microphones are available. Closely
related work can be divided into three categories. The first category
investigates side channels on phones and wearable devices. The
second category explores acoustic side-channel attacks. The third
category aims to achieve device-free tracking via acoustics, using
the existing speaker and microphones in mobile devices.
Side-channels on Mobile Devices. A large body of work on
side-channel attacks exist, exposing user data via readings of sen-
sors on phones and wearable devices. For instance, work exists
on revealing user data, e.g. PIN or graphical passwords through
reading of accelerometer data [3, 16, 17]. A recent article [23] pro-
vides a comprehensive survey and systematic analysis of this line of
work. It clearly supports our claim that our work is the first active
acoustic side-channel attack.
Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks. Obtaining information via
an acoustic side-channel is not new. However, existing work mostly
utilizes acoustic signals passively.
Backes et al. [4] recovers the printed content of a dot-matrix
printer by analysing printing noise. Faruque et al. [11] reconstruct
the object printed by a 3D printer via the emitted sound. Hojjati
et al. [14] demonstrate attacks on a 3D printers and a CNC mills
using audio and magnetometer data. Other similar work in the
manufacturing space are detailed in [5, 8]. Toreini et al. [24] decodes
the keys pressed on an Enigma machine by analysing the emitted
sound. Genkin et al. [13] reveal 4096-bit RSA keys using acoustic
signals generated by a computer.
There is another group of study focusing on recovering keystrokes
on physical or virtual keyboards via acoustics. Cai et al. [7] sur-
veyed potential attacks usingmicrophones. Asonov et al. [1] present
an acoustic attack to classify key presses on a physical keyboard.
Zhuang et al. [33] further improved this work. Berger et al. [6]
presents a dictionary attack based on keyboard acoustic emana-
tions. Compagno et al. [10] infers text typed on a keyboard through
the acoustic signal captured via Skype chat. Liu et al. [15] use two
microphones on a smartphone to inference presses on a keyboard.
Narain et al. [20] use a gyroscope and microphones on a mobile
phone to predict keystrokes on the virtual keyboard.
All these were acoustic side-channel attacks, but they did not
use an active sonar system as we do.
Device-free Acoustic Tracking. There is a wealth of work
achieving human tracking through RF signals. For example, Wilson
et al. [28] use Wi-Fi for tracking.
There is existing work in the HCI area focusing on using acous-
tic signals for tracking finger/hand movements without extra de-
vices [18, 27, 30]. The work by Nandakumar et al. [18] is related
to our work; we base our sonar signal generation on this previous
work. Nandakumar et al. [19] use an acoustic sonar system to detect
people’s location, and linear or rhythmic motions in a 2D plane,
and they can achieve this even through walls.
Our work is different from the existing work in two main aspects.
First, the application scenario is different; existing work does not
study finger movement on the screen of the phone. Second, existing
work does not explore the the possibility of stealing sensitive data
from users via the acoustic system.
8 CONCLUSION
We have developed a novel acoustic side-channel attack. Unlike
the prior approaches where acoustic signals are passively created
by a victim user or computer, we re-purpose a computer device’s
acoustic system into a sonar system. Thereby, an attacker actively
beams human inaudible acoustic signals into an environment. The
echo stream received not only allows the attacker to stealthily
observe a user’s behaviour, but also creates a side-channel that
leaks her security secrets.
With this active acoustic side-channel, our attack could signifi-
cantly reduce the number of trials required to successfully guess a
victim’s unlock pattern on an Android phone. We have noted that
attackers do not have to limit themselves to use only smartphones.
Instead, our attack appears to be applicable in any environment
where microphones and speakers can interact in a way that is
similar to our experimental setting.
Thus, our work starts a new line of inquiry, with fertile grounds
for future research. For example, it is interesting to investigate and
qualify the effectiveness of our attack in different scenarios, and
to explore the best countermeasures for each of the scenarios. We
also expect our work to inspire novel attacks in the future.
While it helps to improve user experience by tracking human
movements and gestures via sound waves or the like, this approach
can have a significant security consequence. Unfortunately, this les-
son had been largely ignored in previous research for long. Because
of the growing popularity of these invisible ‘sensing’ technologies,
the lesson we have learned here is significant.
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